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Introduction 
 
The US-Mexican border is not your ordinary boundary-marker between two 
nations: it is the world’s longest border between a developed and developing nation.  
Mexico has historically been plagued by poverty, lack of employment opportunities and 
unequal distribution of wealth, while the US has long maintained its status as the world’s 
wealthiest nation.  There are vivid signs of the socio-economic and cultural divide 
between the US and Mexico at any of the populated regions along the 1,969 mile (3,140 
kilometers) border.   
In light of the approximately 12 million unauthorized persons currently residing 
within US borders, it’s no wonder why immigration policy typically stands at or near the 
forefront of the nation’s political agenda.  Although it’s an issue that has receives great 
attention from policymakers and the general public, due to failed attempts to formulate a 
comprehensive immigration policy in step with the economical and social realities on 
both sides of the US –Mexico, the immigration debate is raging now as much as ever.   
Since the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was passed by Congress 
in 1986, the US has not technically lacked a comprehensive policy as much is it has 
failed to formulate or effectively enforce a logical policy.  The number of unauthorized 
immigrants in the US has been growing steadily for over a decade, and its uniquely high 
growth rate is evident, as it drastically outgrew estimates based on the 2000 Census 
report.1  The US government’s approach to the issue of immigration has changed only in 
the amount of money spent on border enforcement, yet very little in its reasonability and 
efficacy.  The IRCA, Immigration Act of 1990, Illegal Immigration Reform and 
                                                 
1 Passel, Jeffrey S. “The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the US,” p. 2 
(Pew Hispanic Center, March 7, 2006) http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf 
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Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) , and border enforcement operations of 
the 1990s build the framework of modern US immigration policymaking, with the post-
9/11 era having taken on its own identity as the threat of terrorism is used to justify 
border militarization.   
This report seeks to address two main questions: first, who and what are the 
determining factors forces driving the formulation of US immigration policy since the 
implementation of the IRCA in 1986?  Second, what impact has US policy had on flows 
of Mexican migrants to the US, and on the immigrants themselves?  The principle 
argument is that US immigration policy is formulated with powers given to a Congress 
that historically acts in accordance with the domestic political climate.  Those dynamics 
have resulted in a unilateral approach to immigration policymaking on the US side, 
defined by years of ad-hoc legislation designed more to calm the public’s nerves and win 
votes than actually address the root causes of unregulated inflows of documented and 
undocumented immigrants.   Furthermore, the tendency of the US to focus almost all of 
its resources on militarizing and enhancing border enforcement efforts has resulted in a 
dangerous environment for border-crossers, while giving way to human smuggling and 
drug organizations.  Lost in recent US efforts is a focus on internal enforcement, visa and 
naturalization reform, temporary worker programs, and a binational solution to regulating 
migration.   
The first chapter focuses on the most significant factors that determine US 
immigration policy.  This discussion includes political-party cleavages and their 
respective constituencies, because as previously noted, immigration policy is very much 
determined by interest groups, public sentiment and a Congress that primarily acts 
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according to the domestic climate.  This has been most apparent when the immigration 
debate has peaked around the time of executive and congressional elections, when talks 
have often stunted during the legislative process largely due to election-time interests. 
Another key point of discussion is state and local-level actors, which have played 
an increasingly significant role in immigration policymaking due to the federal 
government’s inability to pass effective, comprehensive legislation.  State and local 
leaders are held accountable by voters in their respective regions, and in order to secure 
reelection many have taken on an active role in immigration control, often overstepping 
the boundary between state and federal authorities.    
And a fourth consideration is the extent to which the Mexican government is a 
player in determining US policy.  Overall US-Mexico relations took drastic turns toward 
an increasingly bilateral and friendly relationship during the promotion of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 1990s, and Mexico’s 
simultaneous establishment of a legitimate multi-party system with free and fair 
elections.  Despite increasingly friendly overall relations, Mexico’s inability to dictate its 
will in the immigration debate has been clearly visible since the IRCA.  And at a moment 
that once seemed a great opportunity, the 9/11 attacks served to greatly distract the US 
away from its regional interests and slow the tremendous immigration reform many had 
predicted in Washington.   
The second chapter focuses on the impact of the IRCA and various major US 
policy-measures taken since 1986.  This discussion pays close attention to the 
Immigration Act of 1990, Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA), 1996 Welfare Reform Act, post-9/11 era of anti-terrorism legislation, and 
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state-level immigration policy.  While the impact of specific Border Patrol (BP) and 
border enforcement policies will be analyzed in great detail in chapter three, this section 
pays close attention to the ramifications of non-border policies and internal enforcement.  
This includes the US visa system, temporary-worker programs, family reunification, 
amnesty packages, employer sanctions, and anti-immigrant legislation on the federal and 
state-levels limiting access to public services.   
The third chapter examines the impact that US policies have had on regulating 
immigration flows from Mexico, as well as its effect on the rise of human trafficking and 
coyotes and migrant deaths along the border.  The 1990s saw the US alter the BP’s 
strategies while simultaneously stepping up funding and enforcement tactics.  Major 
points of consideration during this era of militarization and border buildup are El Paso’s 
Operation Hold the Line (HTL) and subsequent similar operations along the southern 
border such as Operation Gatekeeper, the Arizona Border Control Initiative (ABC), 
Secure Border Initiative and Secure Fence Act.  While many lauded these efforts to 
fortify the southern border as a success, the results are based on apprehension statistics 
that most experts confess are difficult to interpret due to inaccuracies and lack of reliable 
figures on unauthorized immigrants.   
What’s not debatable is the impact these measures have had on the Mexican 
immigrant: with US border enforcement increasingly visible, immigrants have taken 
increasingly dangerous alternate routes to reach US soil.  Among the negative 
consequences of US border enforcement strategies throughout the 1990s and 2000s are 
that migrant deaths have increased, human smuggling organizations have risen to 
prominence, organized crime has surged, while human rights organizations have 
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continually expressed grave concern over the state of the southern border and impact of 
US border enforcement efforts. 
US immigration policy and US – Mexican relations in general are often rooted in 
the difficult task of balancing sovereignty and morality.2  Sovereignty is at the heart of 
any nation’s right and obligation to secure its borders and protect its citizens.  Morality, 
in the case of migration, is multi-faceted: it’s a factor in issues such as family 
reunification policy, detention, amnesty, the impact of border enforcement and how to 
treat immigrants once they are inside the country.  As the longstanding hegemonic power 
of the Americas, the need for the US to invoke its sovereignty with a sense of morality is 
critical in order to achieve a policy of benefit to both nations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Weintraub, Sidney. A Marriage of Convenience: Relations Between Mexico and the United States, p. 180 
(Oxford University Press, 1990) 
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 Chapter 1: US Immigration Policy Determinants 
 
US-Mexican Relations since the 1980s 
Since the 1980s, the extent to which Congress has given room for the Mexican 
government to influence immigration talks in Washington has mirrored the modern 
history of overall US-Mexico relations.  Most academics and experts argue that the US-
Mexico relations have gone through three distinct phases during this time period: the 
1980s were the back-end of a long stage often referred to as laissez faire or benign 
neglect.3  Decisions were made unilaterally and even when Mexico was invited to give 
input at immigration hearings - such as when Congress initially formulated the IRCA in 
1982 – no weight was placed on Mexico’s desires.  There was little effort from either side 
to improve relations or recognize the desires of the neighboring countries.   
By the early-to-mid 1990s, a new era of crisis management was ushered in, just in 
time for the US and Mexico to promote passage of the NAFTA.4  The always-
controversial issue of US immigration policy was intentionally avoided by both parties 
during NAFTA talks, but a desire to pass the free trade agreement by both Mexican 
President Carlos Salinas and the US administrations of President George H.W. Bush and 
then Bill Clinton resulted in a friendlier and more bilateral tone.  The transition toward a 
relationship of dialogue over dictation or benign neglect continued as Mexico’s 
government became increasingly intertwined economically with the US and Canada. 
The third and short-lived phase marked by bilateralism emerged with PAN 
presidential nominee Vicente Fox’s ascension to Mexico’s top office in 2000, which 
                                                 
3 Dominguez, Jorge and Fernandez de Castro, Rafael. Between Partnership and Conflict: The United States 
and Mexico, p. 11 (Routledge, 2001) 
4 Durand, Jorge.  “From Traitors to Heroes: 100 Years of Mexican Migration Policies.” (Migration Policy 
Institute, 2004) www.migrationinfomrtaion.org 
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coincided with George W. Bush’s presidential election in the US.5  Fox marked a new era 
in Mexican politics and was thus was eager to forge a positive relationship with the US, 
while Bush spent many years of his personal and professional life in Mexico and claimed 
to have personal interest in forming policy that would benefit both nations.  He paid his 
first presidential visit abroad to San Cristobal, Mexico, in February, 2001.  There, the two 
newly inaugurated presidents spoke about a new and improved relationship, and 
observers seemed optimistic it would include reforming migration policy.6  That 
optimism proved to false hope when US foreign policy interests were sidetracked and 
became entirely focused on Afghanistan and later Iraq.   
 The “War on Terror” changed the face of Washington politics.  The question of 
immigration regularization is being determined in a climate of post-9/11 politics, and sine 
9/11 the Bush Doctrine justified much of US policy along the border.  Perhaps more often 
than ever before, the effort to “regain control of the borders” is being called for by 
segments of the general US public.  And despite the distraction of the ongoing two-front 
war, immigration was near the top of the Congressional agenda in 2006, when many, 
massive reform packages failed to pass through Congress.  Those discussions were not 
can’t in any way be described as a legitimate display of bilateralism.  Rather, they acted 
according to US domestic concerns – specifically, US national security and appeasing an 
outwardly displeased public.  Since current Mexican President Felipe Calderon’s victory 
in the 2006 election, he has called for immigration reform on many occasions and 
expressed “deep concern” over the failed US reform attempts that occurred the same year 
                                                 
5 Ibid 
6 King, John.  “Bush, Fox Begin US – Mexican Summit.” (CNN, February 16, 2001) 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/02/16/bush.mexico/ 
 11
as his inauguration.7  However, since the 9/11 attacks there has been no reason to believe 
the US has any motivation to invite in bilateral immigration discussions akin to what was 
spoke by the early Fox and Bush administrations.   
 
Congress and the Executive 
Historically, US immigration policy has been rooted in Congressional interests, 
while the executive branch has generally refrained form playing a dominant role in the 
debate except for certain times.  Those are either periods of extreme public outrage or 
when the US and Mexican leaders have had personal stake in the debate, such as what 
was mentioned under Fox and Bush.  Despite Congress leading the way, in all instances 
the executive branch plays a role: first, the president may speak publically and privately 
on reform packages while they are still in Congress, and second, reserves the right of 
final approval or veto of that passes Congress.8  While these have always been the 
executive branches’ primary roles in immigration policymaking and are important factors 
in any instance, more will be said on the role of the executive branch at a later point in 
this chapter. 
Congress generally formulates policy in response to the domestic political 
climate, and in the case of immigration this holds true.9  The state of the economy and 
need for migrant labor, lobbying efforts by interest groups to Congressional members, 
                                                 
7 Hanson, Stephanie. “Straight Talk on Immigration,” in the Council on Foreign Relations’ Daily Analysis 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 3/15/2007) www.cfr.org 
8 Leiden, Warren. “The Role of Interest Groups in Policy Formation,” in the Washington Law Review, 
70:715 (The University of Washington, 1995) 
9 Rosenblum, Marc. “Immigration Policy: U.S.-Mexican Relations Confront U.S. Political Realities,” in 
Contemporary Cases in US Foreign Policy, p. 238 (Congressional Quarterly, forthcoming 2008) 
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and the collective voice of the US public are three of the most influential factors in 
determining the amount of governmental attention paid to reforming immigration policy.   
Interest groups are wide-ranging and promote both pro-immigrant and anti-
immigrant policy, and emanate both domestically and internationally.  Despite anti-
immigrant groups often landing on the front page headlines more often than their 
counterparts – largely due to their sometimes extremist voice - pro-immigrant groups 
such as those representing the agricultural and service industries have often steered 
policymakers with the greatest amount of influence.10  That can be largely credited to 
immigrant communities’ vast contribution to the US economy.  Although this fact is 
hotly debated in many circles, much evidence does show that immigrants have a positive 
impact maintaining the US economy and providing much needed labor in certain 
industries.11  Yet while that may be true, it is critical to note that no matter how much 
immigrant communities contribute, at least some native groups will be negatively 
affected, thus mobilizing anti-immigrant interest groups.  In fact, surges in immigration 
historically trigger native backlashes in the receiving areas most impacted, and their 
interests are often responded to by federal, state and local legislators.12   
 There is ample evidence that interest groups are the dominant influence on 
immigration policymakers.  Restrictions to immigration are consistently higher in areas 
where lobbying efforts are dominated by labor unions, and lower in areas where business 
                                                 
10 Rosenblum, Marc. “U.S.-Mexican Migration Cooperation: Obstacles and Opportunities,” from the 
Proceedings of the 2006 Conference on Migration, Trade, and Development, p. 13 (Published online by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2006) http://www.dallasfed.org/research/pubs/migration/rosenblum.pdf 
11 Griswold, Dan. “Mexican Migration, Legalization and Assimilation,” at the Civitas Forum on 
Reconsidering Immigration and Citizenship in the 21st Century (Published online by the Center for Trade 
Policy Studies, October 5, 2005) www.freetrade.org 
12 Money, Jeanette. “No Vacancy: The Political Geography of Immigration Control in Advanced Industrial 
Countries,” in International Organization, vol. 5: p. 685-720 (Cambridge University Press, 1997) 
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interests are of greatest importance.13  The result of lobbying efforts is a Congress that 
has tried to meet drastically varying demands, thus dividing the debate into numerous 
factions.  US party cleavages have often dictated the potential passage or failure of 
immigration bills at the congressional level, as well as the type of proposed policy 
reforms.  However, the Congressional immigration discussions of 2006 illustrated how 
partisanship does not determine the outcome of the immigration debate with as much 
consistency as it does other issues on Capital Hill.   
One instance in which this can be seen was the various failed reform packages 
that were hotly contested in Washington in 2006, a time which saw both partisan-politics 
and divisions within political parties.  Those attempts at massive reform saw the likes of 
current Republican presidential nominee and then Arizona Senator John McCain crossing 
party lines to work hand-in-hand with Massachusetts’ Democratic Senator Edward 
Kennedy.  The two coauthored the “McCain-Kennedy” bill, which failed in Congress due 
primarily due to opposition from the right, as well as smaller segments of the left.14  
Interest group lobbying efforts determine the types of demands placed on policymakers, 
but their agenda’s are born from varying viewpoints that relate to many different societal 
issues, including converging economical, cultural, moral and religious demands.15   
Mexican and Mexican-American interest groups have become increasingly 
mobilized in recent years, and logically, they tend to promote pro-immigrant reform.  
Mobilization is largely a response to the rise of hard-liners in the anti-immigrant 
                                                 
13 Facchini, Giovanni; Mayda, Anna Maria; Mishra, Prachi. “Do Interest Groups Affect Immigration?” 
discussion paper from the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA, November, 2007) 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp3183.pdf 
14 Rosenblum, Marc. “Immigration Policy: U.S.-Mexican Relations Confront U.S. Political Realities,” in 
Contemporary Cases in US Foreign Policy, p. 242 (Congressional Quarterly, forthcoming 2008) 
15 Rosenblum, Marc. The Transnational Politics of US Immigration Policy, p. 32 (Center for Comparative 
Immigration Studies at the University of California, San Diego, 2004) 
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movement, as many communities have seen a surge in hate-crimes, worksite raids, 
arrests, and general hostile treatment of Mexican immigrants.16  Organizations such as 
Mexicans Without Borders - which strives to attain permanent residency for all 
undocumented immigrants residing in the US and establish legal channels for future 
waves – are working to advance the cause of the Mexican immigrant from both amnesty 
and humanitarian standpoints.17  It is groups stemming from these institutions and forces 
that generally influence the debate from a human rights aspect.  This list includes 
Mexican, Mexican-American, non-governmental and specific human rights organizations 
such as Amnesty International. 
A study of the Houston, Texas and Chicago, Illinois metropolitan areas showed 
the main forces behind pro-immigrant mobilization are non-state institutions such as the 
Catholic Church and community organizations, both of which have a strong presence in 
Mexican and Mexican-American communities.18  And as the rapidly growing Hispanic 
population mobilizes in the US, the group has received much attention for its value as a 
voting bloc.  Hispanics historically support democratic candidates, although current 
President Bush received a Republican record 40 percent of the Hispanic vote in the 2004 
presidential election.19  In any case, the growing political and economical impact of the 
Hispanic community, combined with the emergence of many new Hispanic communities 
                                                 
16 Selenas, Maria Elena. “Mexico Welcomes Home Returning Migrants,” in the Arizona Daily Star 
(Arizona Daily Star, 12/25/2007) www.azstarnet.com 
17 Cardenas, Maria.  “Mexicans without Borders leader Maria Cardenas’ interview with S&L Magazine 
(S&L Magazine, May, 2005) www.socialismandliberation.org 
18 Cano, Gustavo. “The Chicago-Houston Report: Political Mobilization of Mexican Immigrants in 
American Cities,” prepared for the Research Seminar in US-Mexican Relations, p. 7 (Center for US-
Mexican Studies, October 30, 2002) http://repositories.cdlib.org/usmex/cano 
19 Whitesides, John; Mason, Jeff. “Obama, McCain Spar Over Immigration,” from Reuters (Reuters Press, 
June 28, 2008) http://www.reuters.com 
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throughout the country, are causing politicians across the board to walk a fine line trying 
to satisfy anti-immigrant and pro-immigrant constituencies. 
Other pro-immigrant lobbying efforts typically emanate from the business sector, 
particularly the industries which rely heavily on a strong labor force and unskilled 
workers.  The agricultural, meat, and service industries’ lobbying efforts all have a 
tremendous effect on the decisions of immigration policymakers.  Their efforts are 
valuable because as representatives of from the private sector, they usually have the most 
money and therefore carry the most weight.  The groups are not as concerned with human 
rights conditions as much as the “bottom line,” but in a capitalistic society such as the 
US, wealthy lobbying groups will generally yield the most influence.  They are seeking 
less restrictions, an open-gateway for immigrant workers to arrive in the US, and policy 
that would enable employers to avoid sanctions. 
Leading the effort on the other side of the debate are labor unions.  Unions are 
fairly well-financed through membership fees and have a great deal of political influence 
due to the potential support from their large membership bases, which is always desirous 
come election time.  However, the greater the lobbying efforts, the higher union 
membership fees rise, which doesn’t go over well during difficult economic times.  This 
brings to light a critical difference between anti and pro-immigrant actors: although the 
anti-immigrant forces often receive the most attention, its pro-immigration forces that 
often have the most successful lobbying efforts due to their deep pockets.  
 Other anti-immigrant groups promoting stricter enforcement can be found among 
mobilized populations in areas most affected by immigrants.  This includes groups such 
as the Minutemen, founded by Jim Gilchrist, a newspaper reporter from an area 50 miles 
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north of San Diego, California.  Gilchrist has attracted a massive following that not only 
fights for stricter immigration regulation in Washington, but is notorious for physically 
guarding border areas not patrolled by federal authorities.  Most of the actors that come 
from this pool can be classified as hard-liners and occasionally extremists.  Their real-life 
impact on policymakers is limited due to poor funding and lack of a cohesive agenda.  A 
2006 audit showed the Minutemen took in 418,000 US Dollars (USD), but spent 449,493 
USD, during which time many unsatisfied members broke away from the group and 
formed their own organizations, such as the Patriots Border Alliance.20  Not only is this 
evidence of poor funding, but divisions such as are exemplary of the wide array of 
pressures on Congress.   
  The general public sentiment is also a powerful force in forcing immigration 
reform onto the political agenda, but is also a force in determining the complex divides 
that uniquely define the immigration debate compared to other issues that break precisely 
down along party-lines.  Numerous polls and studies attest to the US public’s often poor 
image of Mexican immigrants and concern about immigration policy.21  Thus, there is 
always a sense of urgency to “do something” about border security and immigration 
control. 
One effect the general public can have is to motivate the president to become 
active in reform talks.  During high-times of executive interest in immigration 
policymaking, presidential desires have typically been delivered in the form of political 
rhetoric and speech acts.  However, as previously mentioned, the executive does play a 
                                                 
20 Scarpinato, Daniel. “Minutemen Founder Besieged from Within,” in the Arizona Daily Star (Arizona 
Daily Star, December, 23, 2007) www.azstarnet.com 
21 Belanger, Maryann; Espenshade, Thomas J. “Immigration and Public Opinion,” in Crossings: Mexican 
Immigration in Interdisciplinary Perspectives, p. 368 (Harvard University, 1998) 
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significant role in either promoting or diffusing policy proposals during the legislative 
stages, and also either approves or vetoes laws once they have passed through Congress.  
These roles should not be understated: presidents can strongly influence a divided 
Congress to vote a certain way by testifying at congressional hearings and establishing 
immigration task forces and commissions, such as the hugely important US Commission 
on Immigration Reform.22  Moreover, presidents generally show increased interest in 
immigration policy leading up to major reform packages, which was evident under 
President Ronald Reagan leading up to the IRCA. as well as when George W. Bush 
entered office in 2000 and during the 2006 failed reform package debates in Congress.23 
One other instance in which a president plays a significant role in immigration is 
when they have a legitimate personal interest in the issue.  This was on display in 2000, 
when Bush and Vicente Fox entered office in the US and Mexico, respectively.  While 
Bush had served as Governor of Texas, Fox was the first PAN nominee to reach the 
highest office in Mexico, snapping a streak of more than an 80 consecutive years during 
which time Mexico was under the rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).  
Like Bush, Fox often spoke about change and hope of an improved future.  However, 
these efforts were largely derailed following the 9/11 attacks in New York and 
Washington.  And even though Bush claimed to have a personal interest in immigration 
reform, when the issue resurfaced on the Congressional agenda in 2006, the US leader 
was blamed by many for not committing enough resources and relying on Congress to 
                                                 
22 Rosenblum, Marc. The Transnational Politics of US Immigration Policy, p. 24 (Center for Comparative 
Immigration Studies at the University of California, San Diego, 2004) 
23 Kernell, Samuel.  Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership (Congressional Quarterly 
Press, 1997) 
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determine the proposals.24  Undoubtedly, immigration policymaking is driven by 
Congress with the president playing only a secondary role, which typically has shown 
deference to the former.   
 
State-Level and Local-Level Policymaking 
In recent years state-level actors have been passing legislation at unprecedented 
rates, a phenomenon that roots from states and localities that feel the federal government 
has failed to address border control and respond to unauthorized immigration.  As of 
April, 2007, all 50 states were considering immigration-related bills, and the amount of 
such bills considered in the first quarter of 2007 doubled the amount in the first quarter of 
2006. While not all the bills are overtly anti-immigrant, most of them can be defined as 
such.  Moreover, it’s in local areas that are historically the least affected by immigration 
where the most aggressive restrictions have been proposed, suggesting new waves of 
immigrants relocating to new regions has had a negative effect on state and local 
sentiments.25      
These sweeping attempts to institute reform are a reaction to the inaction of 
federal powers: the inaction of Congress has given the responsibility and power of 
immigration regulation back to state and local-level actors.26  This includes the infamous 
Proposition 187 and likeminded legislation that has passed through the pipeline in recent 
years.  States such as California, Texas, Illinois, Florida and New York are hit hard by 
                                                 
24 Rosenblum, Marc. “Immigration Policy: U.S.-Mexican Relations Confront U.S. Political Realities,” in 
Contemporary Cases in US Foreign Policy, p. 237 (Congressional Quarterly, forthcoming 2008) 
25 Audrey, Singer. “Statement of Dr. Audrey Singer before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, 
Refugees, Border Security and International Law,” at the hearing on the Impact of Immigration on States 
and Localities (May 17, 2007)  www.brookings.org 
26 Boulard, Garry. “Immigration - Left to the States,” in State Legislatures, p. 15 (October/November, 
2006) www.ncls.org 
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waves of immigrants, and specific to Mexican immigration, the list includes Arizona and 
New Mexico.27  It’s in these areas where since the 1990s we have seen such high rates of 
state and local immigration policymaking and circumvention of federal authority.  Not 
surprisingly, citizens of states along the border as well as throughout the country are 
voicing their displeasure with federal inaction, and consequently state-level and local-
level policymakers are reacting by trying to appease their constituencies with action that 
goes beyond political rhetoric. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Calvo, Janet, “Alien Status Restrictions on Eligibility for Federally Funded Assistance Programs,” in the 
New York Law Journal, p. 429-30 (New York Law Journal, 1987/88) 
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Chapter 2: Impact of Non-Border Enforcement Immigration Policy 
 
US policy response to immigration control failures have historically been focused 
on border enforcement, however, while such efforts are of huge importance and will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, comprehensive immigration systems 
are inclusive many different governmental policy areas.  In the case of Mexican 
migration to the US, family reunification, the visa system, temporary worker programs, 
worksite enforcement, and restricted access to public services are all part of immigration 
policy.  The cumulative effect of these policies in the US has a tremendous impact on 
Mexican immigration and on immigrants. 
 Any analysis of a nation’s comprehensive immigration policy must look at the 
visa and citizenship system, or what Susan Martin, of the Institute for the Study of 
International Migration, calls the “first line of defense” in regulating migration.28   
Specifically, it’s important to decide whether a migrants potential to enter and work 
legally is able to satisfy the high demand for Mexican workers in the US, and many 
social and economical push factors in Mexico.  Whether one can land on a “pathway to 
citizenship” and enter a legal permanent resident (LPR) under reasonable regulations, the 
temptation to enter illegally would be reduced.  However, these processes are lengthy and 
difficult for the unskilled worker who generally has limited resources.    
 At the heart of the US visa and citizenship system is its preference given to family 
reunification over a skill-based criteria.  Under current US policy, legal immigration 
quotas are determined by the Hart-Celler Immigration Bill of 1965, which is also the 
legislation that called for entry rights based on family reunification.  Since 2002, the 
                                                 
28 Martin, Susan. “Unauthorized Migration” US Policy Responses in a Comparative Perspective,” p. 5 
(Institute for the Study of International Migration, March, 2007) http://isim.georgetown.edu 
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department of US Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) has placed LPR applicants 
into one of seven classifications, each with its own quota limit.  However, applicants that 
are immediate family members of immigrants who have naturalized and become US 
citizens are guaranteed entry.  Other family members of US citizens and immediate 
family members of LPRs are given special quota limits designed to enhance their chances 
of legally crossing the border.   
The US family reunification based system has a tremendous effect on the 
Mexican migrant, particularly since 1986.  The IRCA offered amnesty to unauthorized 
immigrants that had been in the country since before 1982 (when the IRCA was 
originally proposed), and approximately 2.7 million immigrants residing in the US 
became LPRs and started on a potential pathway to citizenship.  Approximately 2 million 
of these peoples were Mexican nationals.  Naturally, the IRCA opened gateways for 
many Mexicans wanting to migrate because of family reunification.  This is evident in 
the numbers -, of the 1,063,732 LPRs admitted in 2002 under policy largely determined 
by the IRCA, 63% entered as family members of citizens or LPRs. Typically, at least 
two-thirds of incoming migrants enter the US under this classification every year.29  The 
IRCA gave amnesty to some 2 million Mexicans and when their families wanted to join 
them in their new homes, US policy made that possible.  That did not, however, 
effectively slow unauthorized migration for any extended period of time, as the demand 
for workers in the US and conditions south of the border are always the strongest 
determining factors of migration flows.   
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Family members of US citizens are guaranteed entry to the US, and after five 
years as an LPR an immigrant may apply for citizenship.  Once a citizen, an immigrant 
no longer has to worry about being subject to immigrant-related legislative measures that 
often affect LPRs.  This time-period is important because when the 1996 Welfare Reform 
Act was passed – many aspects of which were anti-immigrant and restricted immigrant 
access to social services - immigrants that had naturalized were protected.  Restriction of 
access to public services is a growing trend in federal, state and local policy measures, 
thus the importance of the potential for an immigrant to naturalize and be exempt from 
discriminatory laws.   
Employment-based immigrants fill out much of the segment that does not migrate 
through family reunification, although even those admitted to the US on an employment-
based visa are able to use family ties to their advantage during the application process.30 
However, no more than 100,000 employment based visas were distributed in any one 
year of the 1990s, not because of quotas but rather due to preferences for family 
reunification applications and excessive waiting periods.  As with many bureaucratic, 
governmental institutions, some of the difficulties with the US visa system involve 
backlogs and delays.  During the 1990s it took as long as 3 to 4 years for some visa 
applications to be processed.  In its 1997 Executive Report the US Commission on 
Immigration Reform admonished officials for not having expedited the naturalization 
process, concluding that, “Two years later the naturalization process still takes too long, 
and previous efforts to expedite the processing resulted in serious violations in the 
integrity of the system.  Instituting a system that is both credible and efficient remains a 
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pressing need.”  The Commission added that in 1995, waits for spouses and children of 
LPRs was an unacceptable 3 years, and in 1997 there were waits of more than 4 years.31   
Waits remained at least 2 years before efforts to reduce the backlogs in 2004 
proved somewhat successful, and the number of such cases dropped from approximately 
3.85 million in 2004 to 1 million in 2006. But a current lack of funding allocated to US 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has resulted in a slowdown of that 
progress, and delays remain rampant.32 Backlogs lead to misinformation in various 
governmental databases and cause painfully long waiting periods for applicants.  The 
inaccuracies in the government’s system can affect unauthorized and authorized 
immigrants in many ways, particularly internal enforcement efforts that involve checking 
documentation and matching it with state and federal records.  More importantly, the 
delays unintentionally encourage illegal entry, because history shows us that those eager 
enough to migrate northward from Mexico will resort to illegal channels when there’s no 
reasonable, legal alternative.   
 Another aspect of the US visa system worthy of attention is the lack of an 
adequate temporary-worker program in the US.  Experts such as Daniel Griswold, 
Director of the Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies, claim that the Bracero 
program of the 1940s to 1960s caused a reduction in illegal immigration.33  At the time 
temporary workers were needed in the agriculture industry, and by opening legal 
channels both the Mexican migrant and US economy benefited.  In fact, the modern, high 
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rate of illegal migration to the US made its initial ascent shortly after the Bracero 
program was halted in 1964.     
Policy which opens legal gateways to the US naturally reduces flows of illegal 
migration.  This is because the primary cause of illegal border crossings is that it’s often 
the better alternative.  However, since the IRCA legalized a vast number of the 
unauthorized immigrants residing in the US prior to 1982, there has been no further 
implementation of sufficient temporary work programs, and the current H-2A and H-2B 
visa classifications that primarily impact Mexican immigrants fall far short of providing 
viable options that immigrants can choose which are not illegal entry.  
The H-2A visa applies to the agriculture industry and is the visa which gives legal 
entry to temporary and seasonal workers.  The federal program, which was established 
under the IRCA, allows agricultural employers who anticipate a labor shortage to apply 
for the right to hire foreign workers on a temporary or seasonal basis.  In order to qualify 
employers must prove that there are not enough domestic workers available and that the 
wages and of U.S. workers won't drop due to importing foreign workers.34  The program 
mandates employers provide housing, meals or access to cooking facilities, compensate 
according to the standard US pay scale, but agree to hire any US worker that applies for 
the position before 50 percent of the contract has been fulfilled.35  The H-2B temporary 
worker visa program is essentially the same as the H-2A, but applies to unskilled 
nonagricultural workers.  This category primarily consists of meat-packing and service 
industry workers who are predominantly Mexican nationals.   
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Despite evidence pointing to the necessity of a temporary worker program in 
proportion with the social and economical push and pull factors at work in US - Mexico 
migration, there has been an unwillingness to implement a system of such magnitude 
since the end of the Bracero program.  While there is no officially accurate statistic, 
estimates of the inflow of illegal migrants into the US are often placed at about 500,000 
per year.36  Implementing a temporary worker system could greatly reduce the temptation 
of illegal crossings, and incentives such as being placed on track to eventually become an 
LPR could ease the transition for all parties involved.   
The H-visa is not used more extensively for many reasons, and policymakers fear 
that although law requires temporary workers demonstrate their intent to leave the 
country once their job is complete, the mere intent of return migration will prove to be 
untrue.  Perhaps this is why Congress passed laws further restricting use of the H-visa 
compared to its original form: While there had been no numerical quotas and little 
security for the domestic labor force, the Immigration Act of 1990 limited H-1B visas to 
65,000.  This visa classification does not impact the unskilled workforce, which is 
dominated by Mexican immigrants, but rather those in a “specialty occupations.”37  
Furthermore, in its 1997 report to Congress, the influential US Commission on 
Immigration Reform stated its opposition to large-scale temporary worker programs for 
unskilled workers, and sought to limit such permission to employers who pass a “stricter 
labor market protection test.”38  Immigration policymakers’ intent is fairly cut and dried: 
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recent US immigration policy is tilted toward protecting domestic workers at the cost of 
not having an effective temporary worker program.  Naturally, illegal migration became 
increasingly likely as legal gateways to the US are shut.   
Those immigrants that do choose illegal options, internal enforcement policies are 
naturally at the forefront of their concerns. The IRCA was the first time the US passed a 
law making it illegal to knowingly hire illegal workers, although since the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA of 1952 there had been laws making it illegal to willfully 
transport, hire or harbor illegal immigrants.39  Thus, at least on paper, the IRCA triggered 
initial US efforts to implement employer sanctions as a worksite enforcement strategy.  
The pitfalls and failures of this effort, however, are well documented, as is the general 
difficulty in carrying out worksite enforcement. 
 The US government and employers verify the status of newly hired workers.  
First and foremost, there is the Employment Eligibility Verification Form Process (I-9).  
The IRCA mandated employers fill out an I-9 form after hiring any new workers 
following the November 6, 1986 passage of the reform package.  Upon being hired, 
employees are required to show at least one of 29 documents approved by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as proof of their legal status.  I-9 forms must be 
kept on record for a period of three years, during which time they are available for 
governmental inspection.  Violators of the I-9 process can be punished by civil and 
criminal charges, known as employer sanctions.40  However, employer sanctions have 
proven to be ineffective and encouraged illegal immigrants to find ways to go undetected. 
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One of the most common problems associated with worksite enforcement are the 
use of counterfeit documents, which has surged since the implementation of the IRCA.  
Furthermore, identity theft of real citizens has been rising continually since the 1980s.41  
Unauthorized immigrants seeking jobs in the US have been forced to obtain these 
documents which often come at a high cost, thus further violating US law by possessing 
illegal or stolen documents.  In fact, following worksite raids carried out by the US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) department in early 2008 which saw 863 
criminal arrests across the country, it was reported most immigrants arrested were 
charged with identity theft.42 
There is also a great deal of confusion and mistakes that have been made in 
verifying the status of newly hired employees, which has resulted in problems for many 
legal immigrants wrongfully accused of working without permission.  The Social 
Security Number Verification Service (SSNVS) is a system tested in 2002 and 
implemented in 2005, as the US addressed concerns over unauthorized immigration in 
the wake of the 9/11 attacks.  SSNVS is internet-based and confirms whether the name of 
a worker matches the Social Security Number (SSN) on record with the employer.   
SSNs are also used in the no-match letter service, in which the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) sends letters to employers with the identities of newly hired 
workers whose name and SSN do not match in governmental records.  Formerly a service 
used to maintain the integrity of the Social Security system, since September of 2007 no-
match letters have been used by the DHS as an immigration enforcement tool: new rules 
                                                 
41 US General Accounting Office. “Identity Theft: Prevalence and Cost Appear to Be Growing.” (GAO-02-
363, March 1, 2002)  
42 “Testimony of Secretary Michael Chertoff before the House Committee on the Judiciary.” (Released 
March 5, 2008) http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1204746985090.shtm 
 28
were imposed on employers in the form of rules implemented that made it difficult for 
them to plead ignorance while not taking action against the employee.  While not legally 
impossible for employers to retain an employee identified as a “no-match,” this makes 
such efforts not worth the time.  Furthermore, ICE is able to use the documentation to 
prove the employer was aware of a worker’s status, and as useful information in 
conducting worksite raids.43  E-Verify is another online system used by the DHS and 
SSA in which employers can volunteer to check the SSN and name for all newly hired 
employees watch according to the records of each department.   
The impact the new no-match letter and other similar enforcement tactics have on 
immigrants is significant. An employee’s name may inaccurately appear on a no-match 
letter for a multitude of reasons, including change of name, clerical mistakes, and 
misspellings of immigrant workers’ names.  Making matters worse for Mexican 
immigrants, employers who receive no-match letters are often businesses that employ 
low-skilled and low-wage immigrant workers, many of which have Mexican names that 
are frequently misspelled.  Employers now reportedly don’t take as many chances and 
simply terminate workers whose names appear in no-match letters.   Lost in the confusion 
are the jobs of numerous immigrant workers with legal permission to reside and work in 
the US, as well as many unauthorized workers who would not have been targeted by this 
system prior to the post-9/11 era.  Worksite enforcement efforts based on inaccurate or 
incomplete databases and amidst a growing circulation of false documents is a policy 
conducive to discrimination against all foreign employees.   
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Due to worksite enforcement having proved to be more rhetoric than reality - at 
best a failed effort throughout US history that at times has pacified anti-immigrant 
factions – federal, state and local governments have adopted immigrant-related 
legislation and enacted many symbolic laws as supplements to clear-cut immigration 
reform packages such as the IRCA or IIRIRA.  Perhaps the greatest example on the 
federal level is the Welfare Reform Act (WRA) in 1996, which put significant restrictions 
on immigrant access to social welfare programs. Under the WRA, legal immigrants may 
not apply for welfare or public benefits within the first 5 years of entering the country.  
Excluded from these restrictions are emergency and disaster services.44  Immigrants have 
been forced to find loopholes by relying on public services not restricted within this and 
similar laws, but at no point did the WRA accomplish the mission objective of reducing 
the economical toll each immigrant takes on the nation’s public services and overall 
economy.45   
One result of continually high Mexican migration rates to the US has been a 
“Mexican Diaspora” throughout the country.  While California and Texas both lead the 
way in terms overall size, states such as Tennessee, Mississippi, Wyoming, and Georgia 
saw over a 100 percent increase in their immigrant populations between 2000 and 2005.  
In 2006, state-level lawmakers responded to growing populations and federal failures by 
introducing more than 550 immigrant-related bills into the state legislature relating to 
areas such as public services, worksite enforcement, and identification requirements.  
While most state-level laws have sought to restrict immigrants, not all have been in line 
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with anti-immigrant interest groups, such as in 2006 when Nebraskans votes to offer in-
state college tuition for children of unauthorized immigrants.46  State-level activity has 
been growing since the 1980s, but with much more velocity since the 1990s and 9/11 
attacks.  
 Restricting immigrant access to public services has never caused a decrease in 
unauthorized migration to the US, which brings the practice into question.  Both the 1997 
Report delivered by the US Commission on Immigration Reform and Binational Study 
outwardly criticized and called for an end to cutting off immigrants from access to public 
services.47  Such restrictions encourage anti-immigrant aggression that at is conducive to 
discrimination and even violence.  More importantly, they don’t address the root cause of 
Mexican migration to the US, which in most cases is economically motivated, and do not 
result in an increase in legal migration. 
 Since 1986 and the IRCA, internal enforcement efforts such as worksite raids and 
employers sanctions have failed to slow unauthorized migration.  The visa system is open 
to Mexican migration in many instances due to its preference given to family 
reunification, numerous problems such as backlogs, cost, lack of a temporary worker 
system and unreasonably high visa standards result in continued illegal entry rates.  And 
these failures by the federal government have increasingly motivated state and local-level 
actors to introduce their own immigration legislation, often promoting anti-immigrant 
policies.  For example, the text of a well-know proposal in Arizona’s 2004 general 
election known as Proposition 200 read, “this state finds that illegal immigration is 
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causing economic hardship to this state and that illegal immigration is encouraged by 
public agencies within the state that provide public benefits without verifying 
immigration status.”48  Accordingly, the bill mandated immigrants show identification at 
voting booths, provide documentation of their immigration status to apply for benefits, 
punish public officials that offer public offer public services without verifying one’s 
immigration status.   
 Perhaps the most publicized of such measures occurred in California when 
Proposition 187 was passed by voters on November 8, 1994.  The statute was designed to 
cut-off immigrants from state public services such as medical care and education for 
immigrant children.49  It was attacked by opponents as unconstitutional and immediately 
suspended while mired in a slew of court cases.  It eventually was defeated on the 
grounds it overstepped the limits of state authority and sought to preempt federal powers.  
Also, the law called for the deportation of immigrants in California without due process 
of the legal system, which combined with its denial of free education for immigrant 
children, violated the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution requiring “equal 
protection.”50  Based on modern policy history, it appears that without successful 
immigration reform, there will be a continuation of state and local activity that has 
already compromised the integrity of federal authority along the border. 
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Chapter 3: Impact of Border Enforcement and Detainment Policy 
 
The IRCA proved ineffective in slowing unauthorized migration and properly 
reforming the process for authorized entries.  The main reason for this is because when 
internal enforcement efforts proved difficult to implement and enforce, Congress turned 
its attention to securing the southern border with force.  The devotion of resources to 
border enforcement strategies has been a growing trend in US immigration policy since 
the IRCA, peaking in the 1990s when the Clinton administration supported new strategies 
that called for increased patrolling all along the southern frontier.  In fact, between 1985 
and 2002, spending on border enforcement grew from $1 billion USD to $4.9 billion 
USD, with most of the money landing in the hands of the BP.51  On the other hand, 
interior efforts during the same time period received only 11 percent of the funds 
appropriated for immigration enforcement. In the post-9/11 era, as pressure to secure the 
border has continued to mount on federal and state policymakers, funds for border 
enforcement shot up from $2.1 billion in 2001 to $2.8 billion in 2002.52  Wayne 
Cornelius, Director of the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at the University 
of California, San Diego, accurately summed up recent US immigration policy in a 2004 
article when he wrote, “During the past 10 years, the overwhelming emphasis in US 
immigration policy has been on border enforcement, primarily on the US-Mexican 
border.  Congress has more than tripled spending for border enforcement activities since 
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1993, despite evidence that this unprecedented border buildup has failed to deter 
significant numbers of unauthorized migrants from attempting entry.”53 
 Heightened border enforcement strategies became the focus of the BP in 1993, 
when Silvestre Reyes, Chief Patrol Agent of the BP in the El Paso, Texas region, initiated 
Operation Hold the Line (HTL).  The operation was centered in highly populated areas 
along the Texas-Mexico southern border, and was designed to make the BP increasingly 
visible to potential border-crossers.  Formulated largely in response to pressure from US 
citizens in cities most affected by unauthorized immigration, a primary goal of HTL was 
to reduce the ease with which Mexican migrants could cross the border in populated 
regions.  At the outset of HTL, BP funding, staffing and overtime hours increased sharply 
in order to amplify their presence and thus deter illegal crossers.54   
 In order to bring attention to what the BP promoted as a successful, new 
enforcement strategy, the agency started to measure its standard of success by how low 
the number of apprehensions dropped following the HTL’s inauguration.  This contrasts 
with pre-HTL measures of success, during which time the BP had historically considered 
a higher number of apprehensions as a sign of greater enforcement.  However, that 
mindset changed following HTL, as the significance of fewer apprehensions was thought 
to mean that there must have been fewer unauthorized immigrant crossings attempted.  
As where apprehensions had been on a 33 percent increase the two years prior to HTL, 
there was a drastic reduction along the El Paso – Ciudad Juarez border region.  
Eventually funding allocated to the BP decreased after the first year of HTL, as did the 
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amount of number of BP agents stationed along the border, and apprehensions slowly 
increased again as crossers seized the opportunity the break through the weakened 
blockade deterrent.55  Frank Bean, Director of the Center for Research on Immigration at 
UC Irvine, concluded in his studies that the longer HTL lasted, the mores its deterrence 
of unauthorized immigration waned.56  However untrue it may have been, HTL continued 
to be heralded as a successful, new strategy that deterred illegal crossings.  Although the 
information we have shows us that there were continued high rates of unauthorized 
migration in the years following HTL, it and similar initiatives are common because in 
the case of HTL, it quiet much of the El Paso population that had long complained about 
peddlers and crime as a consequence of lackadaisical border enforcement.  In January, 
1997, construction began to extend HTL 10 miles west along the New Mexico portion of 
the El Paso border region, carried out with much the 450 million dollars earmarked to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) under President Clinton’s immigration 
legislation.57 
 Although there were many operations inspired by HTL, the one that garnered the 
most attention – much of it negative - was Operation Gatekeeper in California.  
Gatekeeper was announced on September 17, 1994 by then-US Attorney General, Janet 
Reno.  Between 1994 and 1997 the US almost doubled the INS budget, which ballooned 
to 800 million dollars.  Border fencing construction plans in the California region were 
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expedited and doubled, while various other technological innovations were employed by 
the BP. 
Fencing and technology are have been tactics of US border enforcement efforts 
since the IRCA, but have become increasingly popular since HTL, Gatekeeper and 
particularly the 9/11 attacks.  The Arizona Border Control Initiative (ABC), which was 
announced by the DHS on March 16, 2004, is a multi-faceted operation which combines 
the powers of the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP agency, the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA), ICE and other security-related agencies within the US 
government.  Implemented due to the Arizona border region becoming the main gateway 
to the US in 2004, the ABC called for a 370-mile fencing project along the Arizona – 
Mexico border.  The ABC also combined US and Mexican intelligence in order to 
expedite the removal of unauthorized immigrants increased the amount of BP agents 
along the Arizona border, deployed Blackhawk helicopters and funded other 
technologically advanced tools such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which patrol 
and monitor commonly crossed regions.58  The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 
DHS testified to Congress in 2005 that that the Mexican border was susceptible to 
terrorist plots, however, admitted there was no evidence pointing to such conclusions.59  
Clearly, the US has the sovereign right and moral obligation to protect its borders and 
citizens from terrorist attacks, but at this point the group most impacted by the ABC and 
similar operations is unauthorized Mexican immigrants. 
The US-sponsored militarization of the border, its fencing policies, and revised 
BP strategies that began during the 1990s and continue in the post-9/11 era have re-
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routed unauthorized immigrant crossings away from the usual urban points to 
treacherous, desert and mountain terrain.  US Homeland Security Secretary Michael 
Chertoff said in a December, 2007 press conference that the US is committed to building 
370 miles of pedestrian fencing and approximately 300 miles of vehicle fencing along the 
southwestern border, which will “fence about 90 to 95 percent of the border from the 
Pacific Ocean to the New Mexico – Texas border.”  Much of the Texas border, as he 
pointed out, is guarded by the Rio Grande River.60 Experts Jorge Dominguez and Rafael 
Fernandez De Castro describe the Gatekeeper-sponsored border wall, which they point 
out was built largely by army reservists, as the following: 
The US Operation Gatekeeper wall of corrugated steel landing mats is string 
enough to stop trucks that had rammed through earlier barriers…The fence cuts 
across miles of scrub while stadium lights illuminate the thick underbrush.  The 
wall is also electronic.  An array of gadgets can find hidden compartments where 
drugs may be stashed, scan license plates to see if a car is stolen, and help law 
enforcement agents see people in the bushes. 61 
 
There are consequences of ongoing hard power policies such as these, primarily 
for the Mexican immigrant.  One of these is the high rate of deaths along the border, 
where more than 3,000 people perished between 1997 and 2007.62  During the four years 
that immediately followed Gatekeeper’s implementation, 324 people died of heat 
exhaustion in the desert and mountainous regions, or by drowning.63  Gatekeeper has 
been investigated and condemned by various humanitarian organizations such as 
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Amnesty International and the American Civil Liberties Union, the latter of which in 
1999 filed formal charges in Washington and with the Organization of American States 
due to the militarization of the southern border.64 Furthermore, vigilante groups such as 
the aforementioned Minutemen have reportedly attacked, and detained many immigrants 
at the border, while in other instances hate groups have been accused of torturing and 
murdering crossers.65  The US militarization of the border and simultaneous failure to 
properly halt the flow of unauthorized immigrants has contributed to anti-immigrant 
sentiment, as well as the mobilization of groups that put the well-being of immigrants in 
danger.   
While one result of US border enforcement policy and militarization is an 
increase in the danger of the actual crossings, another is the subsequent rise of human 
smugglers known as coyotes.  The distinction between human trafficking and human 
smuggling should be noted: while the former must involve forced migration and 
exploitation, the latter is voluntary migration with that involves push and pull factors in 
the sending and receiving states.  Coyotes have existed since the end of the Bracero 
Program in 1964, and since 1983 most Mexican immigrants have used their services.66  
As early as 2001, reports indicated the longstanding local coyotes were evolving into 
major criminal networks that could earn billions of dollars. Prices soared from around 
300 dollars per person in the mid to late 1990s to between 1,500 and 2,000 dollars in 
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2001.67  Both the cost of and likelihood immigrants would use human smuggling services 
skyrocketed following Gatekeeper.68 
In the case of US – Mexico migration, the growth of smuggling networks has 
significant ramifications for both the Mexican government and the Mexican immigrant.  
The government must compete against growing criminal networks along the border, 
which bring in huge amounts of money while partaking in many types of criminal 
activity, including murder, theft, corruption, and currently the drug war.  According to 
comments made by the BP in 2008, immigrants often act as drug mules by carrying drugs 
for various drug syndicates.69   Clearly, this has a negative impact on the Mexican 
government, US government, and the immigrants themselves: the criminal networks 
prosper and grow at the cost of all the three groups by violating the laws of both nations, 
while forcing often otherwise harmless immigrants to be middle-men in drug trafficking.  
Another consequence for Mexican unauthorized immigrants can be seen in 
situations where officials have manipulated US laws that were originally designed to 
combat smuggling organizations by using them to fight unauthorized immigration.  This 
is a state and local phenomenon that arose both from the failure of the federal 
government to implement comprehensive reform, and also due to a US militarization of 
the border that unintentionally helped give rise to human smuggling networks.  A 2005 
state law in Arizona permitted Country Sherriff Joe Arpaio’s mobilization of a 300 man 
posse that fought unauthorized immigrants by charging them with criminal conspiracy for 
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using the smugglers.  This was not the goal of a state law originally designed with 
potential incarceration of smugglers in mind.70  In November, 2006, attorneys legally 
contested the efforts in a class-action lawsuit filed against Arpaio’s Maricopa County, 
essentially on the basis it was a manipulation of anti-smuggling measures. All six 
immigrants named in the lawsuit were arrested and detained in Maricopa County, but 
never before had commit a crime in the US or Mexico.71  Additionally, the county’s 
practices have been criticized by numerous groups, including the Amnesty International, 
American Civil Liberties Union, Anti-Defamation League, and Arizona Ecumenical 
Council.   
Arpaio continues to be a source of major controversy, seen in his attacks on the 
federal government for its immigration failures and against opponents of his actions.  
This includes Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard and Phoenix Mayor Phil Gordon, 
who have called the Maricopa sheriff out for his often unethical tactics.72  Yet, however 
as legally questionable and misguided Arpaio’s efforts may be, they are rooted in 
influential state and local sentiments which have been touched upon throughout this 
report.  This is evident in the fact he was originally elected in 1992, and reelected in 
1996, 2000 and 2004.73  
The border buildup combined with these aggressive federal, state and local 
initiatives have had some important impacts.  One is the rush to the border, in which 
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immigrants fear heightened US restrictions and rush to the border in hopes of crossing 
before the policy begins to impact reality.  Another is people who get legal entry choose 
to come and overstay their visas, working without authorization ad fly under the radar of 
the US government.  This poses the ultimate problem for the US government, and does 
the immigrant no favors either due to their illegal status.  Yet this is a common 
occurrence since HTL and subsequent border enforcement operations blocked off urban 
crossing points and forced immigrants to rethink the most prudent avenue of migration, 
Return migration to Mexico has been lower while the number of overstays apprehended 
by ICE has consistently been higher during times of stepped up enforcement operations.   
Those caught for overstays or a variety of other laws that illegal immigrants are 
often subject to violation of in the US are then detained.  Immigrant detention centers 
have long been used by the US, and currently the ICE agency operates under a policy 
which states, “Detention and removal of illegal aliens is a priority of ICE.  This 
commitment has been backed by significant resources devoted to detention and removal 
efforts.”74  Both statements are accurate: following the implementation of the IIRIRA in 
1996, there was a major increase in funding channeled to these facilities.  Between 1996 
and 1997 there was a 64 percent increase in the funds appropriated for the removal and 
detainment of immigrants and the IIRIRA mandated the detention of unauthorized, 
criminal immigrants.75  The number of immigrants detained since the passage of the 
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IIRIRA nearly quadrupled by 2002, skyrocketing from approximately 5,000 detainees in 
1996 to 20,000 – 25,000.76   
 There are three categories of immigrants generally detained by the US 
government.77  The first is people seeking asylum who have arrived in the US without 
proper documentation.  This does not impact Mexican immigrants because immigration 
from Mexico has never fallen under the umbrella of political asylum.  The second 
category is people who have overstayed a visa, worked without proper documentation or 
commit any of the numerous common, immigration violations.  Undoubtedly, this has a 
tremendous effect on the Mexican immigrant, because, as previously noted, US 
immigration policy is in many aspects conducive to overstays and the use of false 
documents.  The third category is immigrants who have been convicted of a crime at any 
time in the past, which naturally has a potential affect on immigrants of all nationalities.  
This means that if the US discovers a prior conviction of an immigrant, even LPRs, they 
can be detained for an indefinite period of time.  
A fourth category has also emerged since the 9/11 attacks under which any 
immigrant “suspected of terrorist activity” can be immediately detained for an indefinite 
amount of time.  According to some immigration attorneys in California, although 
Mexican immigration does not have a strong association with terrorism, Mexicans have 
been detained under this category.  Moreover, the legal standard for proving one is 
suspected of terrorist activity is extremely low, which makes any immigrant a potential 
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detainee under this category.78  Obviously, once detained immigrants are subject to the 
often perilous condition of prisons and designated immigrant detainment facilities. 
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Conclusion 
 
Since the 1980s US immigration policy has been centered on militarizing BP 
efforts, and has gone even further in that direction since 9/11.  The defining immigration 
reform packages of the past three decades - the IRCA, Immigration Act of 1990 and 
IIRIRA - all channeled funding primarily toward front-line efforts and secondarily to 
internal enforcement.  Despite a continual dose of political rhetoric from the various 
administrations and Congress, during this time of militarization many aspects of a 
comprehensive immigration control went overlooked.  These are non BP efforts such as 
visa reform, temporary worker programs, proper worksite enforcement and effectively 
addressing the poor state of the Mexican economy. 
 Congress has historically controlled the course of US immigration policy, and due 
to typical Congressional interests, it is thus determined primarily with the domestic 
political climate in mind.  The US president and executive branch is involved in 
immigration policymaking - however, the extent of such involvement is affected by a 
number of factors: it is usually limited to promoting or vetoing laws that made it past the 
legislative stage, and delivering sometimes-influential political speech acts.  Despite 
federal authority, state and local level actors have become increasingly involved in 
immigration enforcement since the 1990s, and have been passing laws at unforeseen 
rates. 
US policy has failed to control flow of Mexican migration, despite purported 
internal efforts and militarized border enforcement in urban areas.  The IRCA gave 
amnesty so nearly 2 million Mexicans inside the US, but failed to enable future legal 
migration.  Inflows are determined first by the state of US job market, and second by the 
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Mexican economy. Therefore, with the world’s wealthiest nation neighboring a 
developing nation, the flow of peoples across the border in search of more money and a 
better life is an uncontrollable force.  The goal, of course, is the establishment of a 
logical, comprehensive policy in step with the demands of the US job market and push 
factors in Mexico.  In other words, what’s needed are more legal entry options into the 
US, made attainable for the average unauthorized migrant who might otherwise enter 
illegally.   
As the abundance of completed research on US immigration policy illustrates, 
there are steps that could be taken to improve the future condition of US - Mexico 
migration.  The hopes that NAFTA would usher Mexico into a new era economically and 
help alleviate migration pressures has long been disproved.  While it is true NAFTA 
enhanced some aspects of Mexico’s overall economic indicators, NAFTA permits 
impactful subsidies in the corn industry and a variety of other agricultural products that 
have put many Mexican farmers out of business.  Many of these people who come from 
Chiapas and Oaxaca have eventually migrated northward, contributing to the pressures on 
the US and illustrating a case of its unintentional promotion of Mexican migration.  
NAFTA is in no regard an immigrant bill, but it did not serve small business in Mexico 
well, within such businesses lay the unskilled labor class that typically migrates to the 
US.  If the US wants to reduce immigration pressures from Mexico and simultaneously 
help potential Mexican immigrants, it will work with the Mexican government to assist 
the unskilled worker class still in Mexico.  Instead of creating an atmosphere conducive 
to outmigration, the US and Mexico must bilaterally ease push factors in the sending 
nation by focusing on development in areas with high sending rates. 
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The US should focus on creating legal mechanisms for legal migration, keeping a 
close eye on Mexico and its unique status as a developing, neighboring country.  This 
includes a temporary worker program that pays respect to the tremendous pressures on 
US - Mexico migration flows.  The IRCA was a good policy in the sense it acknowledged 
there were too many undocumented immigrants to realistically punish or deport.  It 
underscored the overwhelming evidence that immigrants positively impact the US 
economy and serve its labor force well.  But it did not create new avenues for future 
waves of immigrants to come legally, as the H-visa and other programs called for under 
the legislation were formed with unrealistic expectations.   While employer sanctions 
certainly have their proper place, the dilemma of unauthorized immigrant workers could 
be partly remedied by worker programs with options of staying permanently and 
eventually landing on a road to citizenship.  This would be positive for all parties 
involved, as it provides immigrants incentive to live in accordance with the desires of the 
state, and discourages unauthorized entry by offering viable alternatives.   
Enforcement at the border must remain a key feature of immigration control due 
to the realities of the post-9/11 world, and it goes unquestioned that is it any nation’s 
sovereign right to secure its borders and protect its citizens. However, continually high 
unauthorized migration rates show the militarization at the border has been a failed long-
term effort.  Clearly, the task of securing a nearly-2000 mile border with numerous urban 
areas is impossible to accomplish solely through enforcement.  Under modern policy 
immigrants have been attempting to cross illegally in rural, dangerous areas, giving rise 
to criminal syndicates that damage the integrity of both governments and place the 
 46
immigrants in grave danger.  Enforcement efforts need to be reexamined for the sake of 
all parties involved.   
Currently approaching the 2008 US presidential election, questions abound about 
what the two candidates Democrat Barack Obama and Republican John McCain would 
strive to accomplish regarding immigration policy.  Obama has shown some inclination 
in the past to work toward pro-immigrant legislation, such as regulating the cost of visa 
applications in the Citizen Promotion Act.79  Meanwhile, McCain has reverted back to 
more conservative policy ideas since the 2006 Congressional immigrations discussions, 
when he demonstrated that he was willing to cross party-lines in order to come to a 
solution that would appease all players in the complex debate.  Truthfully, there’s no 
reason to that he or McCain have any more at stake than any other president since the 
1980s, and the matter will most likely left in the hands of Congress.  If that’s the case, the 
same party cleavages and interest groups that have confused the debate for years will 
continue doing the same, while bilateralism will have a bleak future in immigration 
policy reform.     
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